Tentative Interpretations: The Abracadabra of Administrative Rulemaking and the End of \u27Alaska Hunters\u27 by Downer, Matthew P.
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 5
4-2014
Tentative Interpretations: The Abracadabra of
Administrative Rulemaking and the End of 'Alaska
Hunters'
Matthew P. Downer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an
authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew P. Downer, Tentative Interpretations: The Abracadabra of Administrative Rulemaking and the End of 'Alaska Hunters', 67





Rulemaking and the End of
Alaska Hunters
I. INTRODUCTION ................................. ........ 876
II. RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPLEX
LANDSCAPE ........................................... 880
A. Defining Rules and Rulemaking .............. 880
B. Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: The Choice Between
Procedural Ease and Judicial Deference ... ..... 882
III. THE ALASKA HUNTERS DOCTRINE ........................ 887
A. The Origins of Alaska Hunters ............... 887
B. The Harmful Effects of Alaska Hunters ... ...... 891
C. Circumventing Alaska Hunters: How Definitive is
Definitive? ........................ 892
D. The Cost of Seizing the Administrative
Abracadabra ....................... 897
IV. THE RISE OF Fox, THE DECLINE OF ALASKA HUNTERS,
AND THE FUTURE OF AGENCY FLEXIBILITY AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW ............................................... 899
A. Outfoxing Alaska Hunters? Exaggerated Rumors
of Alaska Hunters'Demise ................... 899
B. Why Fox Should Extend to Interpretive Rules ........ 901
C. Abracadabra No More: The End of Tentative
Rulemaking Under Fox ..................... 904
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... 905
875
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:3:875
I. INTRODUCTION
Agency flexibility is a battlefield. When circumstances change
or a new regime takes power, federal agencies often adjust their
settled regulations to reflect new realities. There is a persistent
struggle, however, between preserving this flexibility and protecting
those who relied upon the previous regulations.' When an agency
changes course, regulated entities must comply, often with little
warning and at great expense. 2 In 1946, Congress passed the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to balance these interests by
restricting when and how agencies can promulgate and change
regulations.3
Unsurprisingly, the APA did not achieve a lasting d6tente. 4
Instead, it merely created new fronts on which this same conflict has
continued to rage. Perhaps the most interminable of these battles is
the distinction between legislative rules that require notice and
comment and nonlegislative rules that do not.5 In particular,
interpretive rules (a subset of nonlegislative rules) often constitute the
flash point for this larger conflict over agency flexibility.6
1. See infra Part II.
2. See, e.g., Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
("Alaskan guide pilots and lodge operators relied on the advice FAA officials imparted to them-
they opened lodges and built up businesses dependent on aircraft, believing their flights were [in
compliance].").
3. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996) ('The balance that the APA struck
between promoting individuals' rights and maintaining agencies' policy-making flexibility has
continued in force . . . .").
4. Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible
Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 162 (2001):
[W]hile the Supreme Court has increasingly moved towards a more "hands off'
approach, trusting the political process to ensure agency fairness, the D.C. Circuit has
maintained a much more skeptical stance towards agency discretion. This difference
in approach has created what Richard M. Thomas has characterized as "skirmishes"
between the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.
5. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278-79 (2010) ('There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in the field
of administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between legislative
and nonlegislative rules. . . . [C]ourts have labeled the distinction . . . 'tenuous,' 'baffling,' and
'enshrouded in considerable smog.' ").
6. See Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Constitutes "Interpretative Rule" of Agency so
as To Exempt Such Action from Notice Requirements of Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.A.
§ 553(b)(3)(a)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347 (1995) ("[T]he Act does not provide a definition of
'interpretative,' and courts have found the line between interpretative and substantive or
legislative rules to be indistinct. . . ."); Connolly, supra note 4, at 155:
One of the most persistently troubling distinctions in administrative law has been the
difference between legislative rules, by which administrative agencies enact rules that
have all the force of statutes, and interpretive rules, which are supposed to be
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The D.C. Circuit substantially constrained agency flexibility in
a line of cases starting with Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C.
Arena L.P.7 and culminating in Alaska Professional Hunters Ass'n v.
Federal Aviation Administration ("Alaska Hunters").8 Although the
APA explicitly permits agencies to issue interpretive rules without
notice and comment,9 the D.C. Circuit ruled that an agency cannot
change or abandon an interpretation without notice and comment.' 0
The D.C. Circuit justified this gloss on the APA as necessary to
protect those who "relied on . .. an authoritative departmental
interpretation."" In Alaska Hunters, for example, guide pilots and
lodge operators moved to Alaska and started businesses based upon
guidance from the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")
exempting them from the heightened regulations that apply to
commercial air operations.12 Allowing the FAA to change course, the
court reasoned, would impose enormous hardships on pilots and
operators who had relied upon the guidance.13 In the court's view,
protecting these reliance interests justified requiring notice-and-
comment procedures, even though the original FAA guidance was
issued without them.
Some federal courts of appeals, 4 and a plethora of academic
commentators,' 5 have criticized the Alaska Hunters doctrine16 as
announcements by an agency of how it interprets ambiguous language in its own
legislative rules.
7. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
8. 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2012) (stating that notice and comment is not required for
"statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted
by the agency").
10. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034 ("When an agency has given its regulation a
definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in
effect amended its rule, something it may not accomplish without notice and comment.").
11. Id. at 1035.
12. Id.
13. See id. (noting that pilots and guides had already opened lodges and built businesses,
believing they were in compliance, while lacking an opportunity to participate in rulemaking or
argue for a special rule).
14. The First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits reject the Alaska Hunters doctrine. See
Abraham Lincoln Mem'l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536, 560 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Alaska
Professional Hunters Association, Inc. conflicts with the APA's rulemaking provisions, which
exempt all interpretive rules from notice and comment, and with our own precedent and is
therefore not persuasive."); Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In other
words, no notice and comment rulemaking is required to amend a previous interpretive rule."
(citing Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003))); Warder v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[I]n order for notice and comment to be necessary, 'the [later] rule
would have to be inconsistent with another rule having the force of law, not just any agency
interpretation regardless of whether it had been codified.'" (quoting Chief Prob. Officers of Cal.
v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997))).
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inconsistent with a plain reading of the APA and as a harmful
constraint on agency flexibility. Yet the doctrine has become
increasingly entrenched in the D.C. Circuit and has gained varying
levels of acceptance in other circuits as well.17 Some circuits have
explicitly avoided the question altogether.' 8 The Tenth Circuit, for
example, seemed to criticize the doctrine in United States v.
Magnesium Corp. of America19 but ultimately ducked the issue, noting
that merely tentative interpretations (as opposed to definite ones)
could be changed or abandoned without notice and comment, 20 even
15. Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917,
918 (2006) ("Academic commentary on [the Alaska Hunters doctrine] has been scathing."); see
also, e.g., William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1329 (2001)
("[I]t is difficult to justify the courts' reasoning on the basis of precedent or statutory language.");
Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an
Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 846 (2001) ("When the D.C. Circuit says, as it did in
Alaska Professional Hunters, that the FAA can alter the informal but longstanding policy of its
Alaska regional office only by engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it stands
conventional ideas about precedential systems on their head . . . ."); Connolly, supra note 4, at
157 ("[T]he Alaska Hunters doctrine is both a misreading of the relevant statute and undesirable
as a policy matter. . . ."); Brian J. Shearer, Comment, Outfoxing Alaska Hunters: How Arbitrary
and Capricious Review of Changing Regulatory Interpretations Can More Efficiently Police
Agency Discretion, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 167, 171 (2012) ("The [Alaska Hunters] doctrine is in
conflict with the APA, which expressly exempts all interpretive rules from notice-and-comment
requirements.").
16. Connolly, supra note 4, at 156 ("This Note ... names this new development the 'Alaska
Hunters doctrine' after the most sweeping case that has articulated it."). The Alaska Hunters
doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "one-bite rule." See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 415-16 (2012).
17. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) ("[I]f an agency's present interpretation of a
regulation is a fundamental modification of a previous interpretation, the modification can only
be made in accordance with the notice and comment requirements of the APA."); Dismas
Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 682 (6th Cir. 2005) ("It is true that once an
agency gives a regulation an interpretation, notice and comment will often be required before the
interpretation of that regulation can be changed."); Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622,
629 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[The APA requires an agency to provide an opportunity for notice and
comment before substantially altering a well established regulatory interpretation.").
18. United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) ('We
have no need to wade into such deep waters to decide the appeal before us."); Warshauer v. Solis,
577 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2009) ('We need not (and do not) take sides in this debate,
because we conclude that Warshauer failed to satisfy even the Alaska Professional Hunters/
Paralyzed Veterans approach.").
19. See Magnesium Corp. ofAm., 616 F.3d at 1139 ("For a prescription of how to conduct
rulemaking, we must look instead at § 553 [of the APA], which makes perfectly clear that the
notice and comment procedures required for substantive (or legislative) rules just don't apply to
'interpretative rules.' ").
20. Id. at 1145 ("[W]e hold that EPA hasn't previously adopted a definitive interpretation
of its 1991 rule. Even under the case law U.S. Magnesium asks us to follow, the Agency is at




under Alaska Hunters. In doing so, Judge Gorsuch observed in a
footnote that such an escape hatch could serve as "a sort of
abracadabra of administrative decisionmaking" by allowing agencies
to employ "assuredly tentative" interpretations that could be changed
at will.21 The agency, of course, would still intend the interpretation to
shape the behavior of regulated parties-and would likely succeed in
doing so, despite the claimed tentativeness. 22
Because this so-called abracadabra enhances agency flexibility,
we might expect courts to more willingly follow Alaska Hunters.23 But
the opposite might be true. This gloss superficially addresses the
central critique of Alaska Hunters: that it ossifies agency action. But
incentivizing agencies to downplay the definitiveness of their
interpretations threatens the very reliance interests that Alaska
Hunters sought to protect. Which interpretations should regulated
entities rely on? When can they take agency assurances at face value
and when should they hold back for more definitive guidance? Courts
would find themselves in the awkward position of needing to abandon
a doctrine in order to protect the very interests it was intended to
serve. 24 Thus, both sides of the Alaska Hunters debate-those who
favor agency flexibility and those who favor reliance interests-should
be able to agree: the time has come to abandon Alaska Hunters.
Regardless of whether courts continue to enforce the Alaska
Hunters doctrine-with or without the abracadabra gloss-arbitrary-
and-capricious review will still constrain agencies' ability to alter or
abandon interpretive rules. Specifically, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. did just that.25 While
Fox did not directly overturn Alaska Hunters, it undermined key
aspects of Alaska Hunters' reasoning and, perhaps more importantly,
21. Id. at 1143 n.16.
22. Id.
23. While the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have rejected the Alaska Hunters
doctrine, see supra note 14, the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have adopted it. See SBC Inc. v.
FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117
F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbit, 238 F.3d 622, 629 (5th Cir. 2001)
("We agree with the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit; the APA requires an agency to provide an
opportunity for notice and comment before substantially altering a well established regulatory
interpretation." (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586)); Dismas Charities, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 682 (6th Cir. 2005) ("It is true that once an agency gives a
regulation an interpretation, notice and comment will often be required before the interpretation
of that regulation can be changed." (citing Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1033-34)).
24. See infra Part III.D.
25. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 546 (2009).
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provided a better framework for balancing the need for agency
flexibility with the importance of protecting reliance interests.26
Part II of this Note lays out the complex landscape of
administrative rulemaking and judicial deference that gave rise to the
Alaska Hunters doctrine. Part III analyzes the doctrine's harmful
effects and demonstrates that agencies could, with relative ease,
circumvent its constraints through tentative rulemaking. This Part
also illustrates the substantial costs that would result if agencies
embrace the Tenth Circuit's gloss. Part IV argues that the Fox
framework for arbitrary-and-capricious review strikes a better balance
between the interests of agencies and regulated entities than the
current Alaska Hunters regime (with or without the abracadabra
gloss). Part V concludes.
II. RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPLEX LANDSCAPE
Before analyzing the consequences of the abracadabra gloss on
the Alaska Hunters doctrine, it is important to first survey the
landscape in which the doctrine exists. The Alaska Hunters doctrine
implicates two of the more complex and contested conflicts in
administrative law. Section A of this Part explores the distinction
between legislative and nonlegislative rules,27 and the level of scrutiny
courts should apply to a given agency action.28 Section B then explains
the tradeoffs that agencies confront when choosing which type of rule
to issue.
A. Defining Rules and Rulemaking
What, exactly, is a "rule"? Under the APA, the better question
might be, "What isn't?" The statute defines "rule" so broadly that the
term encompasses any agency statement of "future effect" intended to
impact law or policy. 29 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more
26. See infra Part IV.A.
27. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 278 ("There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in the
field of administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between
legislative and nonlegislative rules").
28. See id. at 281-82.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012):
"[Riule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or
financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services
or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on
any of the foregoing.
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encapsulating definition. The APA then describes two primary
methods of rulemaking: formal and informal. Formal rulemaking-the
less common variety-involves a trial-like hearing in which rules are
made "on the record."30 Informal notice-and-comment rulemaking-
the more common variety-requires the agency to (1) provide notice of
the proposed rule,31 (2) give "interested persons" the opportunity to
comment,32 and (3) include a "concise general statement of [the rule's]
basis and purpose."33 A third method has emerged, however, due to
the APA's exceptions to the notice-and-comment requirement. The
APA explicitly exempts "interpretive rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 34 These
agency actions, while still APA "rules," 3 5 are even less formal than
informal rules. 36
Though notice-and-comment rulemaking was designed to be
simple and efficient, all three branches of the federal government
have, to varying degrees, made the process more difficult. In the
decades following the passage of the APA, the D.C. Circuit led other
courts in slowly expanding the procedural requirements for notice and
comment.37 In 1968, for example, the D.C. Circuit held in Automotive
Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd that the agency's "concise general
statement of . .. basis and purpose" must demonstrate "what major
issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why
the agency reacted to them as it did."38 Nine years later, the D.C.
Circuit held that agencies must "disclose in detail the thinking that
has animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which
that rule is based" and then "respond to significant points raised by
the public" during the notice-and-comment process. 39
30. Id. § 553(c) ("When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this
subsection.").
31. Id. § 553(b)(3) ("The notice shall include . . . either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.").
32. Id. § 553(c) ("[T'he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation.").
33. Id. § 553(b), (c).
34. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
35. See supra text accompanying note 29.
36. Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1467 (1992).
37. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 282 ("In the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts of appeals-
particularly the D.C. Circuit-began supplementing these three basic steps by imposing
additional procedural requirements on agencies in cases governed by § 553.").
38. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
39. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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As the D.C. Circuit imposed consecutive glosses of heightened
expectations, the Supreme Court eventually intervened. In Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Court issued a stern reminder that Congress specifically chose the
procedures in the APA, and courts may not usurp legislative power by
imposing additional requirements on agencies. 40
As Professor David Franklin has noted, however, Vermont
Yankee only spoke to lower courts; it did nothing to prevent the other
two branches from imposing additional procedural requirements.
Indeed, the White House mandated cost-benefit analysis and
centralized review, and Congress required impact analyses for agency
actions that affect small businesses, tribal governments, and several
others.41 Over time, these escalating procedural expectations have
"ossifi[ed]" informal rulemaking, forcing agencies to become
increasingly bureaucratic and inefficient. 42 Agencies, in turn, have
responded by increasingly using interpretive rules and statements of
policy, which are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements. 43
B. Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: The Choice Between Procedural Ease
and Judicial Deference
In addition to the APA's express formal-versus-informal
dichotomy, the statute implies another distinction for agency rules:44
"legislative" rules bind with the force of law, whereas "nonlegislative"
rules do not. 4 5 Despite their different legal consequences, however, it
can be difficult to distinguish between the two. Determining whether a
40. Generally speaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) establishes the maximum procedural
requirements that Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon federal agencies in
conducting rulemaking proceedings, and while agencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights in the exercise of their discretion, reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if
the agencies have not chosen to grant them. And, even apart from the APA, the formulation of
procedures should basically be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress has
confided the responsibility for substantive judgments. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 520 (1978).
41. See generally Franklin, supra note 5, at 283 (discussing the additional requirements
that Congress and the President have placed on notice-and-comment rulemaking).
42. See, e.g., id. at 283-84 (describing the rise of ossification and its impact on agency
rulemaking procedures and behaviors).
43. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes ofAdministrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166-68 (2000) (noting that agencies ranging from the Food
and Drug Administration to the Mine Safety and Health Administration are "avoiding
'ossification' . . . by increased use of 'interpretative rules' and 'policy statements' ").
44. See generally Franklin, supra note 5, at 282-89.
45. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1449, 1462 (2011) ("The main distinction recognized in the caselaw is that legislative rules
have the force and effect of law, whereas nonlegislative rules do not.").
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particular rule is legislative or nonlegislative implicates two connected
inquiries: what procedures are required to promulgate a given rule,
and what degree of judicial deference a rule should receive. The
Alaska Hunters doctrine was born into this complex legal framework,
so this Section attempts to clarify it.
The nature of a proposed rule carries two important legal
implications. First, whether or not the proposed rule is legislative
dictates the required promulgation procedure. Legislative rules, for
example, must go through notice and comment because they are
intended to bind with the force of law. Nonlegislative rules-including
interpretive rules46-can be issued without these procedures because
they merely explain how an agency would construe an existing statute
or regulation.47 Thus, when issuing a rule, agencies must determine
its intended effect and then comply with the corresponding
procedures. Choosing the wrong rulemaking procedures invites severe
consequences: if an agency intends to promulgate a binding rule but
forgoes notice and comment, a court will likely strike it down.48 But
notice and comment is costly and time-consuming, so agencies prefer
to avoid it when issuing less binding rules.
Second, the legislative or nonlegislative nature of a proposed
rule dictates the extent to which courts defer to the agency once a rule
is challenged. 49 In its landmark decision Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court held that judges should
completely defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
ambiguous provisions in its organic statute.50 While some circuits
initially applied Chevron deference to all rules,5 1 the Supreme Court
46. Id. ("[I]nterpretive rules and policy statements (sometimes referred to collectively as
nonlegislative rules') can be issued without any special procedures . . . .").
47. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36 for a description of formal and informal
rulemaking procedures.
48. See Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding a board of
parole's legislative regulations invalid because they did not satisfy notice and comment
requirements).
49. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511 (describing Chevron as dealing "with the problem of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of law").
50. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 866 (1984);
see also id. at 512 ("Chevron has proven a highly important decision-perhaps the most
important in the field of an administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC."). The Court has, however, been reluctant to extend the Chevron doctrine to situations
where multiple agencies promulgated a joint rule. See William Weaver, Multiple-Agency
Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, 67 VAND. L. REV. 275 (2014).
51. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 553 (2000) ("[S]ome circuits, including the D.C. Circuit, have held that
Chevron deference applies to interpretative rules as well as to legislative rules.").
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in United States v. Mead Corp. seemed to restrict Chevron deference to
legislative rules.52 The Court explained that nonlegislative rules
should only be afforded the weaker form of deference established in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 5 3 Thus, after Mead, only a legislative rule can
receive Chevron deference and bind the courts during judicial review. 54
A nonlegislative rule does not bind the courts, but it may nevertheless
persuade through the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements."55
Given these far-reaching implications, agencies and courts
must accurately distinguish legislative and nonlegislative rules.
Theoretically, it should be easy: one purports to bind with the force of
law, and the other merely seeks to clarify congressional or agency
intent.5 6 But in practice, the distinction can prove quite blurry.5 7
Take, for example, a hypothetical regulation that requires
sports arenas to provide wheelchair-accessible seating with sightlines
comparable to standing spectators.5 8 If the implementing agency
subsequently advises arenas to use the average height of American
adult males to estimate the sightlines of standing spectators, the
guidance seems more interpretive than binding. The specificity of the
regulation leaves little room for more. But if the regulation merely
requires "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general
52. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232-34 (2001) (distinguishing
precedential, generally applicable rules from individual classification rulings that still carry the
"force of law"); Franklin, supra note 5, at 276, 280 (construing Mead as "presumptively
disqualif[ying] nonlegislative rules from Chevron deference.").
53. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And whereas previously, when
agency authority to resolve ambiguity did not exist the court was free to give the statute what it
considered the best interpretation, henceforth the court must supposedly give the agency view
some indeterminate amount of so-called Skidmore deference."); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (deciding to treat agency judgments as persuasive guidance in light
of agency experience and expertise rather than as controlling authority).
54. Of course, saying the rule binds the Court under Chevron assumes that (1) the statute
was ambiguous and (2) that the rule embodies a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44, 866.
55. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
56. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 45, at 1462 ("The main distinction recognized in
the caselaw is that legislative rules have the force and effect of law, whereas nonlegislative rules
do not.").
57. Franklin, supra note 5, at 278 (noting that consistent application of the distinction
between legislative and nonlegislative rules has proven "maddeningly hard" for courts and
academics alike); Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis
and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 352 (arguing that the distinction
between legislative and interpretive rules has become increasingly "blurred").
58. With key differences, this hypothetical regulation bears striking resemblance to the
facts in Paralyzed Veterans ofAm. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which I
discuss in some detail below.
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public,"5 9 instead of standing spectators in particular, the
implementing agency has more latitude. If the agency then advises
arenas that "general public" means "standing spectators," the
guidance starts to seem more binding, and thus more legislative.
Neither version of the hypothetical legislative rule is clear on its own
terms. For both versions, regulated parties need more information to
properly comply. But the more vague the initial regulation, the more
likely the interpretation is not actually an interpretation at all, but
rather is itself a legislative rule. If, for example, the hypothetical
regulation merely required "reasonable" sightlines, a subsequent rule
defining "reasonable" to mean "standing spectators in the VIP section"
would seem legislative indeed.
When an adversely impacted party-say, a sports arena
seeking to avoid the expense of installing new seats-challenges an
agency's interpretation, the reviewing court has the unenviable task of
determining whether the agency intended to bind with the force of law
or merely to clarify an existing regulation.60 In ascertaining the
agency's intent, courts consider the rule's text, history, context, and
implementing procedures.61 Courts will strike down an interpretation
that was designed to be legally binding but did not go through notice
and comment. If the agency intended to bind and complied with the
notice-and-comment requirements, courts must grant Chevron
deference to the agency's reasonable interpretations. 6 2 But if the
agency did not intend to bind and did not go through notice and
comment, courts will only consider the agency's interpretation to the
extent that it persuades under Skidrnore.63
Thus, under Mead, agencies must make an important choice:
they can either accept the burdens of notice and comment, and obtain
Chevron protection if their rules are challenged, or they can bypass
notice and comment, and try to justify their rules on a case-by-case
59. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 581 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt.
36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (1996)).
60. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 278 (highlighting the difficulty of crafting a test to
identify an agency's intent).
61. Id.:
Currently, courts do their best by examining the text, structure, and history of the
rule, its relationship to existing statutes and rules, and the manner in which it has
been enforced (if at all) in an effort to ascertain whether the rule was intended to have
binding legal effect or instead was merely designed to clarify existing law or to inform
the public and lower-level agency employees about the agency's intentions.
62. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (discussing the
presumption of Chevron deference in the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
63. See id. at 234-35 (explaining Skidmore deference).
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basis under Skidmore.64 In other words, the Mead framework
essentially forces agencies to choose between procedural ease and
judicial deference. 65 Scholars have described this choice as "pay me
now, or pay me later."66
There is yet another lingering problem with this already
complicated framework. In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.67 (and
again in Auer v. Robbins68), the Supreme Court held that an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation should receive "controlling weight"
unless the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."69 Seminole Rock deference seems to apply regardless of
whether or not the agency promulgated the interpretation via notice
and comment. 70
By contrast, the Mead framework awards Chevron deference to
rules promulgated with notice and comment but Skidmore deference
to rules promulgated without it, including interpretive rules.7 While
some courts have simply conflated Chevron and Seminole Rock,72 the
64. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992).
65. Various scholars have proposed treating the pay-me-now-or-later choice as a clear
indication of whether an agency intended to promulgate a legislative or nonlegislative rule. See
Franklin, supra note 5, at 289-91 (noting that scholars, including John Manning, William Funk,
Donald Elliott, Peter Strauss, and Jacob Gersen, have produced a "long and distinguished line of
writings" in support of adopting this approach). Unfortunately, and somewhat inexplicably,
courts have not taken the bait. Id. at 279 ("What seems just as baffling, however, is that for
many years, administrative law scholars have proposed a simple solution to the problem of
distinguishing between these two types of rules-and courts have failed to take them up on it.").
Instead, courts have continued trying to determine what procedures are required by parsing
various other indications of agency intent. See id.
66. See Elliott, supra note 64, at 1491:
As in the television commercial in which the automobile repairman intones ominously
"pay me now, or pay me later," the agency has a choice: It can go through the
procedural effort of making a legislative rule now and avoid the burdens of case-by-
case justification down the road, or it can avoid the hassle of rulemaking now, but at
the price of having to engage in more extensive, case-by-case justification down the
road.
67. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
68. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
69. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. at 414.
70. See id. (applying heavy deference to a price regulation not subject to notice-and-
comment procedures).
71. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) ("The . . . ruling at issue here
fails to qualify [for Chevron deference], although the possibility that it deserves some deference
under Skidmore leads us to vacate and remand.").
72. For example, Richard J. Pierce wrote that "some circuits, including the D.C. Circuit,
have held that Chevron deference applies to interpretative rules as well as to legislative rules."
Pierce, supra note 51, at 553. Pierce then cites Natl Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126,
1131 (D.C. Cir. 1997), as an example. Id. However, Browner applies Seminole Rock deference
using the "plainly erroneous" standard and does not even cite to Chevron. See 127 F.3d at 1131
(citing Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. at 414) ("Because EPA's interpretation of its water
886
TENTATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Supreme Court seemed to distinguish them in Gonzales v. Oregon.73
There, the Court attempted to reconcile the apparent conflict between
Chevron and Seminole Rock 74 by limiting the latter to regulations that
give "specificity to a statutory scheme the [agency] was charged with
enforcing and [that reflect] the [agency's] considerable experience and
expertise."75 But when the regulation simply "restate[s] the terms of
the statute itself," it does not warrant Seminole Rock deference. 76
III. THE ALASKA HUNTERS DOCTRINE
While the Court's efforts have left substantial ambiguities
unresolved, the Alaska Hunters doctrine upsets the tenuous balance
between agency flexibility and judicial deference.77 Section A of this
Part recounts the origins of the Alaska Hunters doctrine. Section B
describes the considerable criticism of the doctrine. Section C explores
the extent to which agencies could circumvent the Alaska Hunters
doctrine by embracing the abracadabra gloss envisioned by the Tenth
Circuit. Section D examines the negative consequences that this
choice would invite.
A. The Origins of Alaska Hunters
The intellectual basis of the Alaska Hunters doctrine, perhaps
curiously, does not come from Alaska Hunters at all. Rather, the idea
originated in dicta from Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena
L.P.7 8 The facts in Paralyzed Veterans will be quite familiar: the case
basically concerned the arena hypothetical discussed above.79 The
Department of Justice ("DOJ") promulgated a regulation requiring
quality standards regulations is neither 'plainly erroneous' nor 'inconsistent with the regulation,'
the court must defer to the agency's interpretation . . . ." (citation omitted)).
73. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 284 (2006) ("No one contends that the construction is
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,' Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., or
beyond the scope of ambiguity in the statute, see Chevron. . . ." (citations omitted)).
74. The Gonzalez Court used the term "Auer deference." See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257-58.
75. Id. at 256.
76. Id. at 257.
77. Connolly, supra note 4, at 177 ("[Ulnder the perverse combination of Alaska Hunter
[sic] and Seminole Rock, we have the exact opposite: Agency interpretation is high-cost and
inflexible, but once it is promulgated, the public has little recourse.").
78. See Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA,'177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
("Our analysis of these arguments draws on Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena, in
which we said: 'Once an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that
interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and
comment rulemaking.'" (citations omitted)).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
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arenas to provide wheelchair seating with "lines of sight comparable
to those for all viewing areas."80 The DOJ initially provided no
definitive guidance on how to interpret this provision 8' but indicated
that it did not require sightlines over standing spectators. 82 A year
later, however, the DOJ began interpreting the regulation to require
those exact sightlines when it applied this standard to potential
venues for the 1996 Olympic Games. 83 A year after that, the DOJ
officially adopted the standing-spectator position-though without
notice and comment. 84 A month later, the MCI Center, an arena in
Washington, D.C., selected various floor plans that provided for
wheelchair seating, some with sightlines over standing spectators and
some without.8 5  Wheelchair-accessibility interest groups sued,
claiming the regulation required all sightlines to be over the heads of
standing spectators.86 The D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld the DOJ's
change in position without notice and comment, because the agency's
initial silence and unofficial indications did not constitute an actual
interpretation.8 7
This main holding, however, was not the most significant part
of Paralyzed Veterans. In dicta, the court made two important
suggestions: first, the notice-and-comment requirement for
rulemaking also applies to "repeals" and "amendments," and second,
"allow[ing] an agency to make a fundamental change in its
interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment
obviously would undermine [the] APA."88 An agency's initial, settled
80. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 581 (quoting 28 C.F.R.
pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (1996)). DOJ promulgated the regulation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Id.
81. Id. ("[The Department did not initially express a view on whether the 'lines of sight
comparable' language required sightlines over standing spectators.").
82. Id. ("[T]he deputy chief of the Public Access Section of the Department of Justice did
say that '[t]here is no requirement of line of sight over standing spectators.' ").
83. Id. ("By the middle of 1993, however, ... [the DOJ] began taking the position that 'lines
of sight comparable to those for members of the general public' meant 'line[s] of sight over
standing spectators.' ").
84. Id. at 582 ("[The Department published, without notice and comment, a supplement to
its manual that explicitly interpreted 'lines of sight comparable' to require sightlines over
standing spectators.").
85. Id. ("Some, but not all, of the wheelchair seating in the chosen designs would have lines
of sight over standing spectators.").
86. See id. at 581 ("The controversy concerns whether the 'lines of sight comparable'
language of Standard 4.33.3 requires wheelchair seats to afford sightlines over standing
spectators.").
87. Id. at 587 ("We conclude . . . that the Department never authoritatively adopted a
position contrary to its manual interpretation and as such it is a permissible construction of the
regulation.").
88. Id. at 586 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012)).
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interpretation, the court reasoned, becomes part of the regulation.89
Thus, any change to that interpretation constitutes amending the rule
itself, which requires notice and comment. 90
The court arrived at this conclusion by relying on the APA's
definition of rulemaking, set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 551-an "agency
process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule"91-rather than
relying on § 553, which explains rulemaking procedures. 92 But the text
of § 551 only addresses the scope of the term "rulemaking,"93 while
§ 553 actually identifies which situations require notice and
comment.94 Seeking to ground its reasoning in more than a strained
reading of the APA, the court also seized upon Supreme Court dicta in
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital: "APA rulemaking is required
where an interpretation 'adopt[s] a new position inconsistent
with ... existing regulations.' "95 As commentators have noted, 96
though, the context in Shalala strongly suggests that the Court uses
"regulations" to reference binding legislative rules, which differ from
nonbinding interpretive rules.97
89. Id. at 586 ("If the Department, when it promulgated the regulation, had ... clearly
adopted what the Board said, it would be hard to conclude that the Department did not
subsequently 'amend' the regulation in violation of the APA."); accord United States v.
Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) ("The implicit reasoning appears
to be this: if an agency amends its interpretation of a rule, it is effectively 'amending . . . [the]
rule' itself . . . ." (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 579)); Alaska Profl Hunters
Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Murphy, supra note 15, at 923
("The court ... [implied] that an initial interpretation X can become, in effect, a part of the
substantive regulation it interprets.").
90. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 583 ("[Tlhe Department's change in
interpretation is contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act because it circumvents section
553, which requires that notice and comment accompany the amendment of regulations."); see
Murphy, supra note 15, at 923 ("[W]here the agency later abandons interpretation X in favor of
new interpretation Y, it necessarily amends the underlying regulation itself-a move that
requires additional legislative rulemaking.").
91. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(5)).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
93. Id. § 551(5).
94. Id. § 553.
95. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 88 (1995)).
96. Connolly, supra note 4, at 166 n.64 (quoting Shalala, 514 U.S. at 89-90) ("Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, repeatedly uses 'regulation' to mean a binding rule, as opposed
to an interpretation: '[The case] raises significant questions respecting the interpretation of the
Secretary's regulations and her authority to resolve certain . . . issues by adjudication and
interpretive rules, rather than by regulations . . .
97. See supra Part II.
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The D.C. Circuit's dicta in Paralyzed Veterans reappeared two
years later in Alaska Hunters,98 this time as a full holding. Alaska
Hunters addressed whether hunting guides with private pilot licenses
complied with FAA licensing requirements.99 Thirty-five years before
the case, FAA regional representatives had assured hunting guides in
Alaska that private licenses were sufficient because the act of flying
customers was only "incidental" to their profession.100 Though no
evidence suggested that FAA officials in Washington were aware of
this regional interpretation,o10 the Alaskan guides relied upon the
interpretation to make far-reaching life and business decisions.102
Despite the long-standing interpretation, the FAA changed course
without notice and comment, subjecting the now-established guide
pilots to burdensome regulations.103
Drawing on the Paralyzed Veterans dicta, the D.C. Circuit
struck down the FAA's new interpretation in Alaska Hunters.104
Specifically, the court restated the Paralyzed Veterans dicta with one
significant addition: "When an agency has given its regulation a
definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that
interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something it
may not accomplish without notice and comment." 05 The key is
"definitive." In Paralyzed Veterans, the agency's new interpretation
appeared to be valid because the original one was tentative. 0 6 Alaska
98. Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
99. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1031.
100. Beginning in 1963, the FAA, through its Alaskan Region, consistently advised guide
pilots that they were not governed by regulations dealing with commercial pilots . . . . [Tihe
FAA's Alaskan Region concluded that these regulations did not govern guide pilots whose flights
were incidental to their guiding business and were not billed separately. Alaska Hunters, 177
F.3d at 1031.
101. Id. at 1032 ("Whether FAA officials in Washington, D.C. were aware of the advice being
given by their counterparts in Alaska is uncertain. No correspondence or other writing bearing
on the question has surfaced.").
102. Id. at 1035 ("Alaskan guide pilots and lodge operators relied on the advice FAA officials
imparted to them-they opened lodges and built up businesses dependent on aircraft, believing
their flights were subject to part 91's requirements only.").
103. Id. at 1033 (citations omitted) ("In January 1998, ... the FAA published its 'Notice to
Operators' . . . announc[ing] that Alaskan guides who transport customers by aircraft to and
from sites where they provide guiding services, with transportation included in the package price
of the trip, henceforth must comply with the regulations [requiring commercial pilot licenses].").
104. Id. at 1033-34 (citation omitted).
105. See id. at 1034 (emphasis added).
106. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We
conclude . . . that the Department never authoritatively adopted a position contrary to its
manual interpretation and as such it is a permissible construction of the regulation.").
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Hunters went one step farther: if the original interpretation was
definitive, an agency cannot change it without notice and comment.107
B. The Harmful Effects of Alaska Hunters
Critics immediately targeted Alaska Hunters. "Scathing"
academic reviews 08 attacked its form, substance, and implications. As
a matter of form, the decision diverged from the APA's text. 09
Requiring an (admittedly revised) interpretive rule to go through
notice and comment appears directly at odds with the APA's explicit
exception for interpretive rules.110 True, the court tried to ground its
decision in § 551's definition of "rulemaking," but that effort seems
forced at best."'
Substantively, scholars criticized the decision for favoring
reliance interests over agency flexibility.112 Congress had already
codified its desired balance.113 The APA protects reliance interests by
requiring binding rules to be promulgated with notice and comment.114
It preserves agency flexibility by exempting nonbinding
interpretations and policy statements from these requirements." 5
Alaska Hunters shifted that balance. It favored reliance interests over
agency flexibility by expanding the application of the notice-and-
comment requirement and limiting an agency's ability to adjust
interpretations as circumstances or political leadership change.116
Also, because Alaska Hunters relied on the premise that an agency
interpretation becomes part of the original rule, requiring notice and
comment to change that rule transforms a nonlegislative rule into a
107. See Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034.
108. Murphy, supra note 15, at 918.
109. Funk, supra note 15, at 1329 ("[I]t is difficult to justify the courts' reasoning on the
basis of precedent or statutory language.").
110. Shearer, supra note 15, at 171 ("The [Alaska Hunters] doctrine is in conflict with the
APA, which expressly exempts all interpretive rules from notice-and-comment requirements.").
111. See Strauss, supra note 15, at 846.
112. Stack, supra note 16, at 415-16 (noting that the Alaska Hunters doctrine enhances
predictability at the cost of excessively restricting agency flexibility); Connolly, supra note 4, at
172-73 ("By its very nature, a decision like Alaska Hunters that erects procedural barriers to
changes in agency policy leaves an agency less flexible in its capacity to respond to external
changes. ... The protection for affected parties' reliance interests ... is certainly important, but
can be achieved through other, less inflexible means.").
113. See Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1558 ("The balance that the A-PA struck between
promoting individuals' rights and maintaining agencies' policy-making flexibility has continued
in force. . . .").
114. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
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legislative rule. 117 The Alaska Hunters doctrine, then, has the added
consequence of "contraven[ing] the [APA] by eroding the fundamental
difference between binding legislative rules and non-
binding ... interpretive or policy rules."1 18
Finally, commentators decried the more far-reaching, and
allegedly perverse, implications of Alaska Hunters. Ideally, agencies
would have the flexibility to change interpretations as needed, and
judicial review of such changes would protect the public's reliance
interests.119 Under this ideal framework, an ill-advised interpretation
could either be changed internally by an agency or be challenged in
the courts. If interpretive guidance receives excessive deference under
Seminole Rock, however, agency flexibility remains the primary
avenue to change the interpretation. By entrenching an agency's
initial interpretation, the Alaska Hunters doctrine shields
interpretations from agency review while Seminole Rock shields them
from judicial review. 120 Thus, rather than protecting the public, Alaska
Hunters actually does the opposite by preventing agency revision of
potentially harmful interpretations. 121
C. Circumventing Alaska Hunters: How Definitive is Definitive?
And then things got more complicated. Rather than applying
Alaska Hunters as broadly as initially feared, 122 the D.C. Circuit
narrowed its holding to cases in which the subsequent interpretation
was a "significant revision or departure from" the original
interpretation. 123 This narrowing should have strengthened the
117. Connolly, supra note 4, at 173 ("[I]f an interpretive rule were to be changed by notice
and comment, it would become binding upon the public-in effect, it would become a legislative
rule.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 177 ("From the standpoint of both agency flexibility and public protection, an
optimal regime would be one in which agencies could act relatively freely, but the public would
have recourse to an independent judicial review of those actions.").
120. Id.
121. Id.:
[I]f the public no longer faced the prospect of any agency interpretation being de facto
unreviewable, there would be less concern about the need to protect the public's
reliance interests. To take the Alaska Hunters case as an example, the Association
had little chance of challenging the FAA's decision other than to try to force the
agency to proceed by notice and comment rulemaking. Agency interpretation has
largely prospective benefits: It encourages the agencies themselves to adopt publicly
available positions and stick to them, and it allows affected parties to know ex ante
what the agency's position will be in regard to an ambiguous or uncertain text.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 108-21.
123. Connolly, supra note 4, at 179.
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doctrine by mitigating its harmful consequences.124 But the attacks
have continued, and the "definitive" requirement of Alaska Hunters
has given birth to unintended offspring. Specifically, this Section will
analyze how agencies could circumvent Alaska Hunters through the
use of pretextually tentative interpretations.
In the absence of Supreme Court intervention, the circuits have
sharply split over the Alaska Hunters doctrine. The First,125
Seventh, 126 and Ninth127 Circuits have rejected the doctrine, while the
Third,128 Fifth, 129 and Sixth 30 have embraced it. Most recently, in
United States v. Magnesium Corp. of America,131 the Tenth Circuit
seemed to criticize the doctrine, though it ultimately declined to either
adopt or reject it.132 Instead, the Tenth Circuit seized upon the D.C.
Circuit's "definitive" language in Alaska Hunters 33 and explained that
the interpretation was merely tentative.134 Magnesium Corp. involved
a suit by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") against the
magnesium producer, alleging a failure to comply with various waste-
handling procedures outlined in a recent interpretation of a long-
standing regulation.135 The magnesium producer explained that an
earlier interpretation exempted the materials in question and
therefore argued that the interpretation could not be changed without
notice-and-comment procedures.136 The Tenth Circuit reasoned,
however, that the tentativeness of the original interpretation allowed
124. Id. ("The narrowing suggested by the Association of American Railroads decision [to
cases involving significant departures from the revised rule] would go a long way towards
avoiding the difficulties predicted . . . .").
125. Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[In order for notice and comment
to be necessary, 'the [later] rule would have to be inconsistent with another rule having the force
of law, not just any agency interpretation regardless of whether it had been codified.' " (quoting
Chief Prob. Officers of Cal. v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997))).
126. Abraham Lincoln Mem'1 Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536, 560 (7th Cir. 2012).
127. Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Hemp Indus. Ass'n v.
DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003)).
128. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
129. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 629 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Alaska Profl
Hunters Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
130. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 682 (6th Cir. 2005).
131. See 616 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010).
132. Id. at 1140.
133. Id. ("By its terms, the Alaska Hunters doctrine applies only to definitive regulatory
interpretations; even under Alaska Hunters, an agency remains free to disavow and amend a
tentative interpretation of one of its rules without notice and comment.").
134. Id. at 1145.




the agency to change or abandon it without notice and comment. 137
The court termed this circumvention of the Alaska Hunters doctrine "a
sort of abracadabra of administrative decisionmaking."138
If agencies can circumvent Alaska Hunters in this way, a
simple question suddenly assumes enormous significance: what
distinguishes a tentative rule from a definitive rule? Five years before
Alaska Hunters, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Thomas
Jefferson University v. Shalala.139 There, a Medicare regulation barred
teaching hospitals from being reimbursed for the cost of certain
educational activities. 140 The HHS Secretary later interpreted the
regulation as specifically barring cost "redistribution," that is, costs
that had previously been borne by educational institutions. 14 1 But the
agency had omitted any mention of this anti-redistribution principle
in an intermediary letter circulated within the agency.142 The question
was whether that omission constituted a definitive exclusion of the bar
on reimbursing redistributed costS. 14 3 The Court held that the letter
fell short of a definitive interpretation "because . . . [it] did not purport
to be a comprehensive review of all conditions that might be placed on
reimbursement of educational costs."144
How circuit courts apply this definition determines how much
flexibility agencies can gain from the Tenth Circuit's abracadabra
gloss. Of course, the question is unnecessary in circuits that have not
adopted the Alaska Hunters doctrine, so this Note focuses its inquiry
on the doctrine's birthplace: the D.C. Circuit. A survey of the four D.C.
Circuit cases addressing this specific question since Alaska Hunters
reveals a fairly broad definition of "tentative," or rather, a fairly
demanding definition of "definitive."
When the D.C. Circuit considered this question in Ass'n of
American Railroads v. Department of Transportation, it seemed to
place a heavy thumb on the tentative-interpretation side of the scale
137. See id. at 1131 ('The only prior EPA interpretation U.S. Magnesium can point to is, at
best, a tentative one. Because EPA never previously adopted a definitive interpretation, it
remained free, even under the legal precedents on which U.S. Magnesium seeks to rely, to
change its mind and issue a new interpretation of its own regulations without assuming notice
and comment obligations.").
138. Id. at 1143 n.16.
139. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
140. Id. at 513.
141. Id. 515-16.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 516 ('The intermediary letter detailed various categories and amounts of
educational expenses incurred by affiliated medical schools that might be allowable to providers,




when the question of tentativeness was unclear. 145 Petitioners argued
that a technical bulletin interpreting a safety regulation constituted
"an abrupt departure" from a previously definitive agency position.
Because the Federal Railroad Authority had not previously required
railroads to communicate the "precise location" of construction zones
along a train's route, petitioners argued that the technical bulletin
should have been promulgated via notice-and-comment procedures.146
Despite several documents demonstrating that the Railroad Authority
did not require such precise notifications, the court held that "none of
those documents even comes close to the express, direct, and uniform
interpretation" illustrated in Alaska Hunters.147
Three years later, in 2002, the D.C. Circuit continued to tip the
scale in favor of tentativeness in Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc. v.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. There, the court held
that official guidance documents did not constitute "definitive
interpretations" because they were, at best, "ambiguous."148 Similarly,
in Devon Energy Corp. v. Kempthorne, the D.C. Circuit held that "the
guidance documents were far from conclusive in what they said."149
Indeed, the court noted, the company needed to ask clarifying
questions about the meaning of the guidance more than five years
after they were issued.150 Additionally, the court noted that "the
contested guidance documents did not come from sources who had the
authority to bind the agency."11
Finally, the D.C. Circuit held in Met West Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor that conditional or qualified statements of agency guidance are
145. Ass'n of Am. R.R. v. Dep't of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("We are not at
all sure what the various and sundry bits of evidence marshaled by the parties tell us about the
meaning of [the challenged interpretation] . . . . We are equally underwhelmed by the agency's
own evidence.").
146. Id. at 947.
147. Id. at 949.
148. Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 296 F.3d 1120,
1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("The regulatory guidance thus offers some support for the positions of both
Andrews and the FMCSA, and can only be described as-at best-ambiguous. It cannot be said to
mark a definitive interpretation from which the agency's current construction is a substantial
departure.").
149. Devon Energy Corp. v. Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
150. This request for clarification was made in 2002, long after the issuance of the guidance
documents upon which Devon Energy had relied. It is perplexing, to say the least, that the
company was seemingly confused over the propriety of its accounting practices if, in its view, the
matter had been authoritatively resolved over five years earlier. Id. at 1039.
151. Id. at 1041 (rejecting claims that the interpretations were definitive).
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insufficient to bind the agency. 152 Thus, explicitly stating that an
action "likely violated"153 a particular regulation "do[es] not establish
[a] definitive and authoritative interpretation[ ]."154 Rather, guidance
documents promulgated by an agency "do not purport to establish
such a sweeping rule."1 66
In all four cases, the adversely affected parties had relied
upon-albeit to varying degrees 156-Some form of official agency
guidance. And in all four cases, the D.C. Circuit allowed the agencies
to change their interpretations without notice and comment. Given
this rather expansive definition of "tentative," agency guidance can
fall short of definitive for a myriad of reasons: "not purport[ing] to
be ... comprehensive"'5 7  or sweeping;158 failing to be sufficiently
"express, direct, and uniform;"15 9 containing "ambiguous" terms;160 not
coming "from sources who had the authority to bind the agency;"161
including conditional or qualified language;162 or even just giving rise
to clarifying questions from affected entities. 63
Met West notably suggests that whether a regulated entity
substantially relied on or complied with the supposedly tentative
interpretation is, in the end, not dispositive. Rather, the court looked
primarily to the agency's own indications of its intent. Under this
view, reliance and compliance are secondary considerations that can-
but do not necessarily-"elevate an otherwise non-definitive
152. MetWest Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("We have held
that conditional or qualified statements, including statements that something 'may be'
permitted, do not establish definitive and authoritative interpretations.").
153. Id. at 509 ("Mhe agency issued a guidance document stating that using reusable blood
tube holders likely violated 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vii).").
154. Id. at 509-10.
155. Id. at 509.
156. See id. at 506 (twelve years of reliance between the initial and subsequent
interpretations); Devon Energy Corp., 551 F.3d at 1041 (eight years of reliance between the
initial and subsequent interpretations); Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier
Safety Admin., 296 F.3d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (seven years of reliance between the initial and
subsequent interpretations); Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. Dep't of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (two years of reliance between the initial and subsequent interpretations).
157. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 516 (1994).
158. Met West Inc., 560 F.3d at 509.
159. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 198 F.3d at 949.
160. Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1126 ("The regulatory guidance thus offers
some support for the positions of both Andrews and the FMCSA, and can only be described as-
at best-ambiguous. It cannot be said to mark a definitive interpretation from which the
agency's current construction is a substantial departure.").
161. Devon Energy Corp., 551 F.3d at 1041 (rejecting claims that the interpretations were
definitive).
162. Met West Inc., 560 F.3d at 509-10.
163. Devon Energy Corp., 551 F.3d at 1041.
TENTATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
interpretation into a definitive interpretation."'" In Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n v. Harris, the D.C. Circuit's most recent foray into Alaska
Hunters, the court held that reliance is not a "separate and
independent requirement" to find definitiveness. 165 Rather, "[r]eliance
is just one part of the definitiveness calculus." 1 66
With reliance considered an optional component of
definitiveness-and given the veritable grab bag of sanctioned
methods to indicate tentativeness-agencies can, with little difficulty,
pretextually disclaim definitiveness in order to maintain future
flexibility while still directing the behavior of regulated entities.
D. The Cost of Seizing the Administrative Abracadabra
Ironically, the Alaska Hunters doctrine and its abracadabra
gloss pose the most harm to the very interests the doctrine was
designed to protect. In Alaska Hunters, the D.C. Circuit originally
intended to protect reliance interests against the threat of excessive
agency flexibility.167 But under the abracadabra gloss, agencies can
preserve their flexibility by pretextually creating the appearance of
tentativeness 68 while still directing public behavior. When an agency
states that a particular action "likely violate[s]"s69 one of its
regulations, for example, regulated entities will usually comply.
Compliance, however, is not a safe harbor: the agency can always
change course.
While there has always been some confusion about which
interpretations are binding,170 agencies pretextually disclaiming
definitiveness would further muddy the waters. The natural result is a
public confused about which guidance is actually tentative and which
is here to stay.
Consider again the facts in Alaska Hunters. The FAA
"consistently advised guide pilots that they were not governed by the
regulations dealing with commercial pilots."171 The FAA's
164. See Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("Reliance is
just one part of the definitiveness calculus.").
165. See id. at 967-68.
166. Id. at 968.
167. Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
("Alaskan guide pilots and lodge operators relied on the advice FAA officials imparted to them-
they opened lodges and built up businesses dependent on aircraft, believing their flights were [in
compliance].").
168. See supra text accompanying notes 156-63.
169. MetWest Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1031.
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consistency-in other words, the interpretation's definitiveness-
precluded changing its interpretation thirty-five years later.17 2 The
FAA, however, could have reached into its grab bag of tricks, created
the appearance of tentativeness, and-abracadabra!-its future
flexibility would have been preserved. 173 Rather than assuring guide
pilots that they were exempt from the regulations, the FAA could have
advised them that they were likely not governed by the regulations
and then later reversed its interpretation. 17 4 At first glance, the
uncertainty inherent in this flexibility seems no worse than what
existed before Alaska Hunters. Uncertainty exists under both regimes
because the agency can change its interpretation. Prior to Alaska
Hunters, however, the guide pilots could have at least relied upon the
guidance as an accurate reflection of the agency's view at the time.
The agency's ability to preserve flexibility by feigning tentativeness,
however, incentivizes misrepresentations, thereby undermining the
wisdom of taking the agency at its word. This compounded
uncertainty makes it that much more difficult for a pilot to decide
whether the agency guidance justifies the risk of establishing a
business.
Alaska Hunters also jeopardizes the role of the courts in
checking excessive agency flexibility. While the doctrine only applies
when an interpretation is definitive,175 the same is not true for the
application of Seminole Rock deference, which grants "controlling
weight" to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations unless
the two clearly conflict.176 Thus, by issuing tentative interpretations of
its own ambiguous regulations, an agency can change those
interpretations on a whim while still receiving maximum judicial
deference. By enhancing flexibility, this end around Alaska Hunters
does indeed silence critics who decry the opinion's role in ossifying
agency action.177 Rigidity, however, is only one side of the coin.
Excessive agency flexibility, especially when combined with decreased
judicial review, can prove severely harmful as well. Against the
backdrop of incentivizing agencies to claim tentativeness, this new
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 157-63.
174. Cf. Met West Inc., 560 F.3d at 509 (interpreting the language likely violated" as
sufficiently conditional to fall short of definitive guidance).
175. See Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034.
176. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) ("But the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.").
177. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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balance could prove far worse for reliance interests than abandoning
Alaska Hunters altogether.
IV. THE RISE OF FoX, THE DECLINE OF ALASKA HUNTERS, AND THE
FUTURE OF AGENCY FLEXIBILITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Alaska Hunters, then, does not properly balance agency
flexibility and reliance interests. And the ability to circumvent Alaska
Hunters through tentative rulemaking only compounds the problem by
creating perverse incentives for agencies. This Part tries to restore the
balance. Specifically, it details the Supreme Court's recent gloss on
arbitrary and capricious review in FCC v. Fox Television Stations and
explores how extending this gloss to interpretive rules achieves a
better balance than the Alaska Hunters doctrine, with or without the
Tenth Circuit's gloss. Section A argues that Fox undermined, but did
not overrule, Alaska Hunters. Sections B and C detail how extending
the Fox framework to interpretive rules resolves the three harmful
consequences of Alaska Hunters: (1) the inability of agencies to
respond to changing circumstances; (2) the vulnerability of regulated
parties, whose compliance is both costly and subject to agency change;
and (3) the incentive for agencies to mask the true nature of their
policies. Section C also argues that extending the Fox framework to
interpretive rules would more directly align the interests of agencies
with those of regulated parties and more effectively balance agency
flexibility with reliance interests.
A. Outfoxing Alaska Hunters? Exaggerated Rumors of
Alaska Hunters'Demise
Contrary to some claims,17 8 the Supreme Court's decision in
Fox did not overrule the Alaska Hunters doctrine. It did, however,
substantially undermine what little justification the doctrine had left.
It did so in two specific ways: first, it explicitly prescribed the general
level of judicial scrutiny for changes in agency policy, and second, it
constructed a clear framework for balancing agency flexibility and
178. See Reply Brief for the Appellant at 21, Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 2009 WL
6084577 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 2009) (No. 08-5489) (citations omitted) ("Our opening brief (pp. 14-
15) stated that Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska Hunters were wrongly decided and are
inconsistent with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council."); Shearer, supra note 15, at 185 ("Fox overruled Alaska




reliance interests through arbitrary-and-capricious review.'79 While
the Supreme Court stopped short of applying this framework to
changed interpretive rules, it is easy to imagine how such an
application might work. If the Alaska Hunters doctrine collapses
under the weight of its own collateral damage, Fox's framework would
achieve a more desirable balance between agency flexibility and
reliance interests.
Fox involved the change of a long-standing Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") policy related to indecency
findings for expletives appearing on television. 80 The old policy
absolved "fleeting expletives"181 of indecency, whereas the new policy
determined that the fleeting nature of an expletive merely "weigh[s]
against a finding of indecency."182 Dissatisfied at losing this safe
harbor, Fox Television Stations challenged the change in policy as
arbitrary and capricious.183 In holding that the APA permitted this
change, 84 the five-to-four majority also ruled that the applicable
section of the APA "makes no distinction .. . between initial agency
action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that
action."185 Some have argued that Fox thus overturned the Alaska
Hunters doctrine "sub silentio."186
For now, however, the Alaska Hunters doctrine lives on. True,
the Court made a sweeping statement in Fox-that the APA makes no
179. Though Associate Justices Stevens and Souter have since left the Court, both dissented
in Fox. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 546 (2009). Thus, their departures
should not alter the majority.
180. Id. at 517 ("Judged under the above described standards, the Commission's new
enforcement policy and its order finding the broadcasts actionably indecent were neither
arbitrary nor capricious.").
181. Id. at 512 (citations omitted) ("[The order made clear, the Golden Globes Order
eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be actionably indecent, and the Commission
disavowed the bureau-level decisions and its own dicta that had said otherwise.").
182. Id. (citations omitted) ("Under the new policy, a lack of repetition 'weigh[s] against a
finding of indecency,' but is not a safe harbor.").
183. Id. at 516 ("If the Commission's action here was not arbitrary or capricious in the
ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Procedure Act's 'arbitrary [or] capricious'
standard.").
184. Id. at 520 ("Mhe agency's decision to consider the patent offensiveness of isolated
expletives on a case-by-case basis is not arbitrary or capricious.").
185. Id. at 515 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)).
186. See Reply Brief for the Appellant at 21, Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 2009 WL
6084577 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 2009) (No. 08-5489) (citations omitted) ("Our opening brief (pp. 14-
15) stated that Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska Hunters were wrongly decided and are
inconsistent with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council . . . ."); Shearer, supra note 15, at 185 ("Fox overruled
Alaska Hunters sub silentio by holding that the APA does not treat initial and subsequent agency
actions differently.").
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distinction between initial agency action and subsequent changes to
that action.187 But that statement cites 5 U.S.C. § 706 (the APA's
scope-of-review provision that includes arbitrary-and-capricious
review), 188 rather than § 553 (the procedures for rulemaking)189 or
even § 551 (the definition of "rule").o90 The Court in Fox does not seem
to apply this principle to the procedures required to promulgate initial
and subsequent agency policies. Rather, the Court seems to limit its
uniform treatment of initial and subsequent agency actions to the
context of judicial review. Thus, while Fox certainly provides a strong
rationale for overturning Alaska Hunters, it does not actually do so,
either explicitly or by implication. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit and
district courts have continued applying Alaska Hunters, usually
without even a passing reference to Fox.191
B. Why Fox Should Extend to Interpretive Rules
Perhaps more important than further undermining the already
beleaguered Alaska Hunters doctrine, Fox clearly illustrates how the
Supreme Court applies arbitrary-and-capricious review to changed
agency policies.192 Commentators have already suggested that
arbitrary-and-capricious review,193 particularly with the Fox gloss,
187. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
188. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
189. Id. § 553.
190. Id. § 551.
191. See, e.g., Ne. Hosp. Corp. v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (relying on
Alaska Hunters for the proposition that modifying rules falls within the rulemaking guidelines of
the APA without mentioning Fox); Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (relying on Alaska Hunters for the proposition that a "new interpretation must
'significantly revise' the prior interpretation in order to trigger the notice-and-comment process"
without mentioning Fox); Menkes v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 344 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (relying on Alaska Hunters for the proposition that definitive agency interpretations can
only be modified through notice and comment without mentioning Fox); Cove Assocs. Joint
Venture v. Sebelius, 848 F. Supp. 2d 13, 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2012) (relying on Alaska Hunters for the
proposition that a "new interpretation must 'significantly revise' the prior interpretation in order
to trigger the notice-and-comment process" with only a passing mention of Fox); LG Elecs.
U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, 679 F. Supp. 2d 18, 26 (D.D.C. 2010) (relying on Alaska Hunters
for the proposition that definitive agency interpretations can only be modified through notice and
comment without mentioning Fox). But see Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Sebelius, No. 09-2385
(BAH), 2013 WL 5658757, at *8 n.7 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2013) (citing Shearer, supra note 15, at 185-
88) ("[The extent to which Paralyzed Veterans remains good law is decidedly unclear.").
192. Fox, 556 U.S. at 503. See generally Charles Christopher Davis, The Supreme Court
Makes It Harder to Contest Administrative Agency Policy Shifts in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 603, 609 (2010) (explaining the Fox construct for arbitrary and
capricious review).
193. United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)):
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would suitably replace the Alaska Hunters doctrine as a balancing
mechanism for agency flexibility and reliance interests.194 Indeed,
applying Fox to interpretive rules would be quite simple.
The Fox framework for arbitrary-and-capricious review would
require an agency seeking to change an interpretation to satisfy two
primary requirements: first, the new interpretation must be
permissible under the statute or regulation, and second, there must be
good reasons for the agency's new interpretation.195 And when factual
findings support the original interpretation, or when the original
interpretation resulted in "serious reliance interests," the agency must
"provide a more detailed justification" than merely reciting
subjectively "good" reasons.196 But the requirement to consider the
original basis and the reliance interests does not reflect a higher
standard for changing an interpretation than for issuing one; rather, it
merely reflects the reality that changing an interpretation without
considering these factors would be arbitrary and capricious.'97 The
showing does not need to convince the court that the new
interpretation is actually better than the old. It only needs to explain
why "the agency believes it to be better."198
The circumstances at issue in Alaska Hunters helpfully
illustrate how the Fox framework achieves a more desirable balance
between agency flexibility and reliance interests. Recall that hunting
guides had established airplane-dependent businesses in Alaska based
upon FAA regional guidance that they were not subject to the
licensing requirements for commercial pilots.199 Prior to the Alaska
Hunters doctrine, the exceptionally strong reliance interests of the
As it happens, however, there is no reason for undue alarm; at least two other layers
of protection exist, even without the added aegis of Alaska Hunters. First, the APA
itself empowers courts to review "agency action, findings, and conclusions" if they are
"arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of direction, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."
194. Shearer, supra note 15, at 171-72 ("[The arbitrary and capricious analysis in Fox ... is
more effective at limiting agency discretion than the Alaska Hunters doctrine.").
195. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) ("[I]t suffices that the
new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it .....
196. Id.:
Sometimes [the agency] must ["provide a more detailed justification than would
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate"]-when, for example, its new policy
rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or
when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken
into account.
197. See id. at 515-16 ("In such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the
mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and
circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.").
198. Id.
199. Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Alaskan small-business owners were virtually unprotected. Under the
doctrine, the FAA could not change its interpretation to reflect new
safety concerns in a highly regulated field without complying with
arduous notice-and-comment procedures. Given the life-and-death
nature of flight safety and the high degree of FAA expertise, adjusting
the scope of commercial pilot requirements is exactly the kind of
decision Congress intended the FAA to make. 200 Under the Tenth
Circuit's abracadabra gloss, the FAA could have preserved its
flexibility at the cost of misdirecting vulnerable reliance interests. In
sum, these various legitimate interests seem inevitably frustrated.
While competing interests cannot always be satisfied, the Fox
framework achieves a far more desirable balance.
Under the Fox framework, the FAA would need to demonstrate
two things: the new interpretation's permissibility under the statute
and good reasons for the change. 201 Here, neither party disputed the
textual permissibility of extending the definition of "commercial
pilots" to include "guide pilots."202 Demonstrating that there were
"good" reasons for the new interpretation, however, would prove to be
the flash point for litigation. The agency would need to consider the
factual basis for the original interpretation and the subsequent
reliance interests at stake. Here, the factual basis would not prove a
formidable obstacle, as the original interpretation was largely based
on the subjective, regional conclusion that flying was "merely
incidental" to the hunting guides' businesses. 203 The hunting guides'
"serious reliance interests," on the other hand, would require the
agency to make "a more detailed justification" of its new
interpretation. 204 The FAA would not have to prove that its safety
concerns outweighed the reliance interests at stake.205 The new
interpretation would be arbitrary and capricious, however, if the
200. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218-19 (2001):
When Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there has been an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific statutory provision by
regulation, and any ensuing regulation is binding unless procedurally defective,
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that
Congress views an agency's expertise as putting it "in a better position" to make related
decisions).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 195-98.
202. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1030-32.
203. Id. at 1031 ("The Civil Aeronautics Board, adopting the hearing examiner's opinion as
its own, ruled that Marshall's flight with the hunter in search of polar bear was 'merely
incidental' to his guiding business, in part because he had not billed for it separately.").




agency's showing failed to demonstrate sufficient consideration of
those serious reliance interests.206
Thus, agencies would generally maintain the ability to act upon
their expertise without undue procedural burden. But in extreme
cases, when reliance interests are so strong that even a new,
otherwise well-reasoned interpretation seems arbitrary and
capricious, courts would still be able restrict the agency's flexibility.
C. Abracadabra No More: The End of Tentative Rulemaking
Under Fox
The Fox framework achieves a better balance of key interests
than existed before or immediately after Alaska Hunters. But it also
alleviates the harmful effects of agencies using tentative
interpretations to circumvent Alaska Hunters. Indeed, extending Fox
to interpretive rules directly aligns agency incentives and reliance
interests. Under Fox, arbitrary-and-capricious review constrains
definitive and tentative agency interpretations equally. 207 Instead of
looking to agency indications of definitiveness to limit future
flexibility, courts would examine the extent of reliance. This shift
would create two key results: first, agencies would gain nothing by
pretextually disclaiming definitiveness, and second, agencies would
lose flexibility when they induce excessive reliance. That is, an agency
that oversells the definitiveness of its interpretation, inducing "serious
reliance," must later "provide a more detailed justification" to survive
arbitrary-and-capricious review.208 Thus, under Fox, when an agency
clearly and accurately indicates the extent to which regulated entities
should rely on its interpretations, both sides win.
Extending the Fox framework to interpretive rules also avoids
the perverse effects of combining Seminole Rock deference with the
abracadabra gloss on Alaska Hunters. This perverse combination
allows agencies to simultaneously increase their flexibility and
decrease judicial scrutiny, both of which jeopardize the reliance
interest of the regulated public. The Fox framework ensures judicial
review of changes in agency interpretation without resorting to
burdensome layers of additional procedural requirements. Agencies
largely maintain their flexibility, with a carve-out for extreme cases in
which particularly strong reliance interests should prevail.
206. See id.
207. See generally Fox, 556 U.S. at 513-16 (2009) (applying arbitrary and capricious review
irrespective of the definitiveness of the policy in question).




In the long-standing conflict between agency flexibility and
reliance interests, 209 the Alaska Hunters doctrine has proven a
particularly intractable battlefield. While the D.C. Circuit has
narrowed its application, the Alaska Hunters doctrine continues to
distort key agency incentives.
Since the case was first decided, commentators have detailed
compelling justifications for overturning Alaska Hunters: its strained
reading of the APA,210 its apparent infringement upon congressional
authority, 211 its disruption of the tenuous balance between reliance
interests and agency flexibility,212 its threat to judicial review, 213 and
its inconsistency with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Fox.214 While
the Alaska Hunters doctrine has managed to survive this onslaught,
its application may soon draw to a close. The Tenth Circuit recognized
that agencies could circumvent the Alaska Hunters doctrine through
the abracadabra of tentative interpretations. Four D.C. Circuit cases
demonstrate the numerous methods of projecting tentativeness. A
veritable grab bag of tricks, these methods allow agencies to easily
create the appearance of tentativeness in order to preserve future
flexibility. This perverse incentive undermines the reliability of
agency guidance and endangers reliance interests without fully
unshackling agency flexibility.
Persistent foes in the central struggle of modern administrative
governance, agency flexibility and reliance interests have yet to reach
an accord. Before Alaska Hunters, agency flexibility threatened
reliance interests. After Alaska Hunters, reliance interests threatened
agency flexibility. But under the abracadabra gloss, both sides lose.
Hunters in Alaska cannot assess the risk of reliance, and the FAA
cannot adequately respond to air-safety concerns. Perhaps the two
sides of this struggle are more like warring factions. Once their
interests align against the reigning authority, regime change seems
inevitable. In short, the abracadabra circumvention might ultimately
prove to be the gloss that broke Alaska Hunters' back. In its place,
extending the Fox framework of arbitrary-and-capricious review to
interpretive rules would strike a more desirable truce. By constraining
definitive and tentative interpretations equally and focusing on the
209. See supra Part II.
210. See Strauss, supra note 15, at 846.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
212. See supra Part III.D.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 178-86.
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extent of reliance rather than on hints of definiteness, Fox would
incentivize clear and accurate agency guidance to regulated entities.
Under Fox, both sides win.
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